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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout (modern) history, sexual minorities have been treated
differently and discriminated against by state actors. For example,
seventy-eight states worldwide have criminalized sexual relations
between consenting same-sex partners.1 After the May 2013
promulgation of a law permitting same-sex couples to marry and
jointly adopt children, a social divide in France emerged and
numerous demonstrations of those opposing such freedom took place.2
1. LUCAS PAOLI ITABORAHY, STATE SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA (2012),
available at http://www.aidsfreeworld.org/PlanetAIDS/~/media/796515F2D74A4
158AC599504E042F4A8.pdf; INTERNATIONAL LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS
AND INTERSEX ASSOCIATION, ilga.org (last visited May 10, 2014) (providing a
distribution of these states over the world).
2. See Henry Chu & Devorah Lauter, France’s Same-Sex Marriage Law
Exposes a Deep Social Divide, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/15/world/la-fg-france-same-sex-marriage20130716 (describing the bitter divide drawn between supporters and detractors of
gay marriage in France by the French government’s “marriage for all” law); see also
François Béguin, “Mariage pour tous”: Bertinotti estime “qui’il faut que revienne
le
temps
de
l’apaisement”,
LE
MONDE
(Apr.
23,
2013),
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These examples demonstrate that sexual minorities are confronted
with differential treatment by state actors and private individuals
within
their
private
as
well
as
family
lives.
On numerous occasions, the regional human rights monitoring
bodies of the European and Inter-American region, the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “European Court”), and InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR” or “Inter-American
Court”), have dealt with the issue of sexual orientation discrimination
within the sphere of family life. The ECtHR has done so throughout
the years in various cases on subjects ranging from marriage and
custody to adoption,3 while the IACtHR asserted itself for the first
time in 2012 on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile.4 There, the IACtHR found a
violation of the right to family life based on the discrimination of a
lesbian woman in a custody case before Chilean courts.5 The national
court did not award her custody over her three daughters for it found
it not to be in the children’s best interests to live with their mother and
her lesbian partner based on her sexual orientation.6 To what extent
have these regional human rights systems of Europe and the Americas
developed a right to family life, free from discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation?
The interpretation of the term family differs from country to country
and might even be different within the territory of one state;7 it is
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/04/23/mariage-pour-tous-il-faut-querevienne-le-temps-de-l-apaisement_3164821_3224.html (interviewing Dominique
Bertinotti, a member of the Socialist party in France and a staunch supporter of the
“marriage for all” act, about the strong opposition the act received within the French
government).
3. See, e.g., Mata Estevez v. Spain, App. No. 56501/00, 2001 Eur. Comm’n
H.R. 2 (2001), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?
i=001-22334 (holding that a surviving spouse of a same-sex marriage was not
entitled to a surviving spouse pension); see also Simpson v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 11716/85, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 4 (1986), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-596 (finding that the
State did not violate the plaintiff’s rights in throwing her out of her house after her
same-sex partner died).
4. Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶¶ 72–93 (Feb. 27, 2012).
5. Id. ¶ 178.
6. Id. ¶ 55–57.
7. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 19: Protection of
the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of Spouses art. 23, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
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essentially a social concept. Therefore how both the European and the
Inter-American human right systems interpret the concept of family
and whom it includes poses an interesting study.
Within the scope of family life, this article will focus on the
relationship between a child and parent of a different sexual
orientation. To what extent does a right to family through adoption
free from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation exist within
the regional human rights systems? Furthermore, to what degree do
the systems permit the right to maintain family life through custody
free from discrimination for reasons of sexual orientation?
The scope of this article will be limited to the right to family life of
homosexual, lesbian, and bisexuals and will not discuss transgender
issues. The definition of sexual orientation used derives from the
Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human
Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.8
This document, formulated by a group of human rights experts and
initiated by a coalition of non-governmental human right
organizations, contains basic principles of human rights as specifically
applied to issues of sexual orientation.9 The Yogyakarta Principles
define sexual orientation as “each person’s capacity for profound
emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and
sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same
gender or more than one gender.”10
First, this article will set out the concept of discrimination.11
Thereafter, it will examine regional human rights treaties on whether
they deal with discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.12
Finally, this article will take a closer look at the ECtHR’s and InterAmerican Court’s case law on issues of sexual orientation relating to

HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 1) (July 27, 1990) [General Comment No. 19].
8. THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
GENDER IDENTITY 6 n.1 (2007), available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/
principles_en.pdf [hereinafter THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES].
9. Michael O’Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and
International Human Rights Law: Contextualizing the Yogyakarta Principles, 8
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 232–37 (2008) (discussing the process of developing the
Yogyakarta Principles).
10. THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 6 n.1 (emphasis added).
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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the right to family life, especially in custody and adoption cases, after
which a conclusion shall be drawn.13

II. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION: PROHIBITED IN REGIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES?
Where can a legal basis be found for a prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation in general and specifically in
connection to the right to family life? Do the regional human rights
treaties of Europe and the Americas contain a provision providing for
the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?

A. DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION
First, however, what does discrimination entail? In its essence,
discrimination amounts to differential treatment “without an objective
and reasonable justification” of persons in similar situations.14 This
unequal treatment can either have the purpose or effect 15 of making
distinctions on various grounds based on characteristics that are an
indispensable component of a person’s identity.16 Discrimination takes
place when people are treated differently for characteristics that they
cannot change or can change only at the cost of their dignity; such
characteristics include race, gender, or ethnic origin.17 The prohibition
of discrimination works together with the idea that all human beings
are equal and therefore merit equal treatment.18
Discrimination can be either direct or indirect.19 We speak of direct
discrimination when the following conditions are fulfilled: 1) a person
is treated unequally to someone else in similar circumstances because

13. See discussion infra Part III. IV, V.
14. WALTER KÄLIN & JÖRG KÜNZLI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS PROTECTION 345 (2009).
15. See Daniel Moeckli, Equality and Non-Discrimination, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 189 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2010) (noting that under
international human rights law, there is no requirement that discriminatory
differential treatment be based on an intention or purpose).
16. KÄLIN & KÜNZLI, supra note 14, at 345.
17. Id.
18. Moeckli, supra note 15, at 189.
19. KÄLIN & JÖRG KÜNZLI, supra note 14, at 351.
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of the existence of a distinction, limitation, exclusion, or preference;20
2) this treatment is unfavorable and disadvantageous for this person
compared to others in similar situations;21 3) the treatment is based on
a prohibited ground as found in the human rights conventions or
jurisprudence of their treaty bodies and international courts, connected
to a person’s core identity;22 and 4) this treatment cannot be justified.23
No discrimination takes place if a distinction is justified, pursues a
legitimate aim under the conventions, and is proportionate—that is, to
be justified, the discrimination must be suitable, necessary, and
reasonable to achieve that aim.24 Such distinctions are not made on a
prohibited ground but rather on the basis of the legitimate aim they
pursue.25
Indirect discrimination occurs when a neutral measure that does not
make any prohibited distinction, in its practical application,
disadvantages exclusively or disproportionately a group with
characteristics classified as a critical distinction, which again cannot
be justified on serious and objective grounds.26

B. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN
THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Then, do the regional human right treaties contain provisions
prohibiting such discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, a
basis of which we can describe as an unalterable characteristic of a
person’s identity given the Yogyakarta Principles’ definition?
1. European Convention on Human Rights27
Within the region of the Council of Europe, the European
Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) guarantees the prohibition of
discrimination with regards to the enjoyment of the rights provided for
20. Id.
21. Id. at 351–52.
22. Id. at 352.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 353.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 355 (citing to principles espoused in the Human Rights Committee’s
decision in Althammer et al. v. Austria).
27. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov.
4, 1950, Europ. T.S. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
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in Article 14 of the treaty.28 This provision states that such enjoyment
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth, or
other
status.29
Given the language of Article 14, a link between this prohibition
and the right to family life under this regional human rights system is
necessary. In Article 8(1) defines the right to respect for one’s private
and family life, his home, and his correspondence, while the second
paragraph allows public authority to interfere insofar as the
interference occurs in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society.30 Furthermore, Article 12 ensures the right of men
and women of a marriageable age to marry and to found a family,
according to the national laws.31
2. American Convention on Human Rights32
Article 1 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights
(“ACHR”) ensures to all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the state
parties “the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without
any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status,
birth,
or
any
other
social
condition.”33
Article 11 of the ACHR mirrors Article 8 of the ECHR and ensures
the right protected by law to privacy and family life by safeguarding
against arbitrary interference with private life, family, home, or
correspondence, “or of unlawful attacks on honor or reputation.”34
Article 17 describes the rights of family, and calls the family the
“natural and fundamental group unit of society,” which is entitled to
protection by society and the state; as such, it recognizes the right to
marry and raise a family if the conditions under domestic law are
satisfied, “insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of

28. Id. art. 14.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 8.
31. Id. art. 12.
32. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].
33. Id. art. 1 (emphasis added).
34. Id. art. 11; ECHR, supra note 27, art. 8.
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nondiscrimination.”35 Article 17 also ensures the equality of spouses
as to the rights and responsibilities to marriage and its dissolution.36 In
case of dissolution, the protection of any children involved shall be
solely
based
on
their
best
interests.37
Article 30 provides that the rights under the Convention can be
restricted when so provided in laws for reasons of “general interest”
insofar as these restrictions are in accordance with the purpose for
which
they
have
been
established.38
The provisions on discrimination of both the ECHR and ACHR
contain essentially the same bases on which no distinctions can be
made; however, sexual orientation is not expressly one of them. Yet,
the prohibition clauses described leave room for interpretation. Article
14 of the ECHR prohibits discrimination on any ground and enlists
examples of such grounds, while Article 1 of the ACHR rules out
discrimination on any other social condition than those enumerated.39
In the following section, we shall see whether the issue of sexual
orientation discrimination in the right to family life has nonetheless
been dealt with in these systems.

III. THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE FREE FROM
DISCRIMINATION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION:
ECTHR
A. INTRODUCTION
Article 19 of the ECHR established the ECtHR (“European Court”)
“to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the
contracting parties.”40 The European Court is comprised of judges
equal in amount to the number of contracting parties.41 Its principle
role is to judge applications brought by individuals42 as well as states43
on violations of the convention and its protocols.44 Article 46 compels
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

ACHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2).
Id. art. 17(4).
Id.
Id. art. 30.
ECHR, supra note 27; ACHR, supra note 32.
ECHR, supra note 27, art. 19.
Id. art. 20.
Id. art. 34.
Id. art. 33.
ROBIN C A WHITE & CLARE OVEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 20 (5th
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state parties to abide by the final decision taken by the European Court
in the cases brought against them.45
Article 14 contains an accessory prohibition of discrimination on
any ground in relation to the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the
Convention and its protocols.46 Once the European Court finds itself
confronted with an application under Article 14, it first examines
whether this claim falls within the scope of one of the articles of the
Convention.47 With regards to issues of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in violation of the right to family life, and in
particular in adoption and custody cases, the question is then whether
such claims fall within Article 8. It is therefore necessary to look at
the definition of family as used within the ECHR system of human
rights protection. What constitutes a family under the ECHR and who
will find their family life protected by the Convention? This article
next examines how the European Court has dealt with claims under
Article 14 of discrimination on grounds of sexuality in connection to
Article 8’s protection of the family life.
1. Definition of Family in the European System of Human Rights
Protection
Article 8 of the ECHR guarantees the right to private and to family
life.48 In the Peck case,49 the European Court recognized that the
definition of private life is broad and contains elements such as gender
identification, name, sexual orientation, and sexual life.50 Private life
includes the right to establish and develop relationships with others
and the outside world; there is a “zone of interaction” that falls within
the scope of private life.51 The right to family life is more specific and
protects the specific relationship between those constituting a family.52
Then, who is seen as part of a family deserving of protection of his
family life from discrimination under Article 8 in conjunction with
ed. 2010).
45. ECHR, supra note 27, art. 46.
46. Id. art. 14; WHITE & OVEY, supra note 44, at 546.
47. WHITE & OVEY, supra note 44, at 547.
48. ECHR, supra note 27, art. 8.
49. Peck v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44647/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 57 (2003),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60898.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Article 14?
Family life exists primarily in the relationships between a husband
and a wife on the one hand, and the parent and the child on the other.53
The “existence . . . of family life is a question of fact,” however,54 and
the European Court has increasingly taken account of social changes.55
Family life extends further than formal relationships and the family
based on marriage,56 and it can include potential or planned
relationships, as well as those family ties that are more social than
biological.57
As to the relation between a child and its parents, whether married
or not and living together or not, family life exists from the moment
the child is born.58 Only in very exceptional situations can this bond
between child and parent be severed as to end family life. 59
Further, relationships between siblings, grandparents, and
grandchildren and between uncles and nephews are within the scope
of family life.60 However, “[t]he more remote the relationship,”
depending on the actual circumstances of the relationship, the softer
the state’s obligation of protection.61
When determining if a relationship between unmarried adults
constitutes family life, a number of factors are important: “whether the
couple lives together, the length of their relationship and whether they
have demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children
53. See generally DAVID JOHN HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 371–76 (2d ed. 2009) (exploring the
jurisprudential development of the notion of “family life”).
54. WHITE & OVEY, supra note 44, at 335.
55. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 371–72.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 372.
58. Id.; Berrehab v. The Netherlands, App. No. 10730/84, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶
21 (1988), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?
i=001-57438; Keegan v. Ireland, App. No. 16969/90, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 44
(1994), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00157881.
59. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 373 (noting violence towards the child as
an example through which the relationship may be severed); see also Gül v.
Switzerland, App. No. 23218/94, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶¶ 32–33 (1996), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57975 (finding that the
family life bond still existed even after a father left his son for years and lived far
away but then returned and sought contact).
60. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 374.
61. Id.
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together or by any other means.”62
Thus, a hierarchy of relationships within the right to family life
seems to exist. On the first plane, we have the traditional family of a
husband, wife, and children, followed by non-married heterosexual
couples raising children, and then more removed family relations at
the lowest level.63 What is the place of relationships between two
people of the same sex?
In its earlier case law, the European Court decided that same-sex
relations did not fall within the scope of article 8.64 In X., Y. and Z. v.
United Kingdom,65 for example, the European Court stated that such
relationships only fall within the sphere of private life.66 In MataEstevez v. Spain,67 the European Court did not find a violation of the
right to family life because the relationship between the applicant and
his deceased partner did not fall within the scope of this right. 68 The
interference in this case fell within the claimant’s private life under
Article 8,69 and was justified under the legitimate aim of protecting the
traditional family.70
In Simpson v. United Kingdom,71 the applicant’s tenancy rights were
viewed from the protection of the applicant’s home and not her family
life. Such interference again was legitimate for the protection of the
62. Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, App. No. 50963/99, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 112 (2002),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60522; X.,
Y., and Z. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 36–37
(1997), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?
i=001-58032; see also Kroon v. Netherlands, App. No. 18535/91, Eur. Comm’n
H.R. ¶ 30 (1994), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search
.aspx?i=001-57904.
63. WHITE & OVEY, supra note 44, at 337.
64. Sarah Lucy Cooper, Marriage, Family, Discrimination & Contradiction: An
Evaluation of the Legacy and Future of the ECtHR Jurisprudence on LGTB Rights,
12 GERMAN L.J. 1746, 1746–47 (2011) (discussing the evolution of the right to
family life for same-sex couples under the ECtHR case law).
65. X., Y., and Z., App. No. 21830/93, ¶ 36–37.
66. Cooper, supra note 64, at 1756.
67. Mata Estevez v. Spain, App. No. 56501/00, 2001 Eur. Comm’n H.R. (2001),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-22334.
68. Cooper, supra note 64, at 1757.
69. Id. at 1756–57.
70. Id. at 1757.
71. Simpson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11716/85, Eur. Comm’n H.R.
(1986), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001596.
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traditional family.72
A change can be perceived in the European Court’s case law in
Karner v. Austria.73 The applicant complained of a violation with
respect to his private, family life, and home under Article 8. 74 After
the death of his partner he could not exercise his tenancy rights since
he did not qualify as a “life companion” on the basis of his sexual
orientation.75 The European Court did not find it necessary to examine
the case from a private or family life point of view because the
complaint clearly fell within the scope of the right to respect for his
home.76 Although the protection of the traditional family was a
legitimate aim,77 the European Court found no reason to exclude samesex couples from the term “life companion.”78
Further development is shown in Burden v. United Kingdom,79
where the European Court appeared to put homosexual civil partners
on the same level with married couples by comparing it to the
relationship of two siblings sharing a home together.80 Then, in Kozak
v. Poland,81 the European Court suggested that same-sex relationships
might constitute family life.82 Polish tenancy law excluding same-sex
partners from “de facto marital cohabitation” was found to violate

72. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7 (admitting that the applicant was treated differently because of
her sexual orientation, but that the family, defined as a heterosexual couple, deserves
special protection); Cooper, supra note 64, at 1757.
73. Karner v. Austria, App. No. 40016/98, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶¶ 30, 40–41
(2003), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00161263 (finding that the applicant’s case fell within the scope of Article 8’s protection
of family life).
74. Id. ¶ 30.
75. Cooper, supra note 64, at 1757–58.
76. See Karner, App. No. 40016/98, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 33.
77. Id. ¶ 40.
78. Id. ¶¶ 41–42.
79. Burden v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (2008),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-86146.
80. Cooper, supra note 64, at 1759 (referring to Burden v. United Kingdom in
which the European Court differentiated the relationship between siblings, who are
connected by blood, and married couples and homosexual civil partners, who choose
to live together).
81. Kozak v. Poland, App. No. 13102/02, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (2010), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-97597.
82. Id. ¶¶ 98–99 (explaining that respect for family life must account for
developments and changes in perception in society, including the rights of sexual
minorities); Cooper, supra note 64, at 1760.
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Articles 8 and 14 because this exclusion was not necessary for the
protection of the traditional family.83 The Court held that respect for
one’s family life “must necessarily take into account developments in
society and changes in the perception of social, civil-status and
relational issues, including the fact that there is not just one way or
one choice in the sphere of leading and living one’s family or private
life.”84 Finally, in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria,85 the Court found the
same-sex relationship of the applicants to be within the scope of family
life.86
Regarding the question of what qualifies as a family life as protected
under Article 8 in custody cases, a child born into a traditional family
of married heterosexual parents shares family life with both his parents
and vice versa. Since Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, a same-sex
relationship itself also constitutes family life between the partners.
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in connection to
one’s family life and in particular in adoption and custody cases,
therefore, may fall within the scope of Article 8’s protection of family
life and possibly make an additional violation of Article 14.

B. CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Does a right to family life free from discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation exist in the European Court case law? How has it
dealt with complaints of differential treatment in custody cases
because of their subsequent same-sex relationships in particular?
1. Sexual Orientation Discrimination and the Right to Marry and
Found a Family: Schalk and Kopf v. Austria
In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, the European Court found for the
first time that same-sex relationships fall within the scope of Article
8. It was also the first case in which the European Court dealt with the
question of whether the institution of marriage under the ECHR was

83. Cooper, supra note 64, at 1760; see Kozak, App. No. 13102/02, Eur.
Comm’n H.R. ¶ 99.
84. Id. ¶ 98.
85. Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 301141/04, Eur. Comm’n H.R.
(2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00199605.
86. Id. ¶ 94.
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open to same-sex couples.87 The applicants were in a same-sex
relationship, which they wanted to have recognized before the law as
marriage, but Austrian law did not allow this.88 They claimed this law
violated Article 12 and Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14.89
With regards to the right to marriage and to create a family protected
by Article 12, the European Court states that this article does not force
the contracting parties to grant same-sex couples the right to marry.90
The applicants interpreted the Convention as a “living instrument” and
argued that Article 12 was intended to oblige state parties to open the
institution of marriage to same-sex couples; but the European Court
did not follow this interpretation because no European consensus yet
exists on this subject.91 Although the European Court accepts that the
right to marriage does not have to be limited to heterosexual couples,
each individual state to must decide on the possibility for same-sex
relationships to be recognized with marriage.92
With regards to the violation of Article 14 in conjunction with
Article 8, the European Court found that an evolution had taken place
in recent years and that the relationship between two same sex partners
would be protected under the right to family life.93 The European Court
further concluded that “same-sex couples are just as capable as
[heterosexual] couples of entering into committed stable
relationships” and thus are similarly in need of legal recognition and
protection of their relationships.94 However, the European Court found
that neither Article 8 nor Article 12, read in combination with Article
14, impose the positive obligation for state parties to legally recognize
a right to marry for same-sex couples.95
Moreover, with no European consensus recognizing such
relationships by other means such as partnerships, it was therefore up
to the states to decide if and when to recognize these relationships.96

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶¶ 7–9.
Id. ¶¶ 39, 65.
Id. ¶ 63.
Id. ¶¶ 57–58.
Id. ¶¶ 61–62.
Id. ¶ 94.
Id. ¶ 99.
Id. ¶ 101.
Id. ¶¶ 105–06.
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2. Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Custody Cases: Salgueiro da
Silva Mouta v. Portugal
The European Court has dealt with discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in custody decisions and in one case in particular:
Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal.97 The applicant married C.D.S.
in 1983 and on November 2, 1987 the couple had a daughter, M. 98 In
April 1990, the applicant separated from his wife to live with a man,
L.G.C.99 During the divorce proceedings, the applicant signed for
C.D.S. to have custody over their child.100 Eventually he sought an
order to obtain custody over his daughter, which was granted to him
by the Lisbon Family Affairs Court.101 On appeal this decision was
repealed using the following reasoning:
The child should live in a family environment, a traditional Portuguese
family, which is certainly not the set-up her father has decided to enter into,
since he is living with another man as if they were man and wife . . . . [I]t
is an abnormality and children should not grow up in the shadow of
abnormal situations; such are the dictates of human nature. 102

The applicant claimed that this decision violated Article 8 on the
basis of family life alone and in conjunction with Article 14 because
the decision to award custody to his ex-wife was based solely on the
ground of his sexual orientation.103
The European Court first found that the issue of parental
responsibility fell within the scope of Article 8 and that there was an
interference with the applicant’s family life.104 The European Court
went on to state that in the enjoyment of the rights of the Convention,
Article 14 affords protection against differential treatment, without an
objective and reasonable justification, of persons in the same situation
and that the applicant was indeed treated differently on the basis of his

97. Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, Eur. Comm’n
H.R. (1999), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?
i=001-58404.
98. Id. ¶ 9.
99. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 10.
101. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
102. Id. ¶ 14.
103. Id. ¶ 21.
104. Id. ¶ 22.
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sexual orientation.105 The European Court held that sexual orientation
as a basis of discrimination is prohibited by Article 14 since the words
“any ground such as” suggest that the list therein is not exhaustive.106
This difference in treatment is discriminatory if there is no objective
and reasonable justification, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim, or
if there is no proportionality between the aim and the differential
treatment.107 The European Court found the legitimate aim was the
protection and best interests of the child.108 However, Article 8 in
conjunction with Article 14 was violated because the difference in
treatment was not proportionate to this aim; the applicant’s
homosexuality was the decisive factor in awarding custody and it
should not have been.109
The European Court extended the prohibition of discrimination
under Article 14 to include the prohibited ground of sexual orientation
because the list in Article 14 is not exhaustive. Further, the European
Court accepted that custody decisions fall within the scope of family
life since the applicant was the biological parent of the child. However,
the European Court did not examine the question of whether family
life existed between the father, his new partner, and the child as one
unit.
3. Sexual Orientation Discrimination and Adoption
While in custody cases, the right to family life between a child and
one of his parents of different sexual orientation already exists in
principle, this is different for the right to family life established
through adoption between a child and his adoptive parent(s). How has
the European Court dealt with cases where an application for adoption
was denied on the basis of the sexual orientation of the adoptive
parent?

105. Id. ¶¶ 26–28.
106. Id. ¶ 28; see also Engel and others v. The Netherlands, App. No. 5100/71,
5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 72 (1976), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57479.
107. See Salgueiro da Silva Mouta, App. No. 33290/96, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 29.
108. Id. ¶ 30.
109. Id. ¶ 35.
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a. Fretté v. France110
The applicant was a single homosexual man applying for prior
authorization to adopt a child in October 1991.111 The Paris Social
Services Department denied his application in 1993 and stated that it
was questionable whether his particular circumstances as a
homosexual man would allow him to be entrusted with a child.112 The
highest court, the Conseil d’Etat, found that the application should be
denied for “it emerges that Mr Fretté, regard being had to his lifestyle
and despite his undoubted personal qualities and aptitude for bringing
up children, did not provide the requisite safeguards—from a childrearing, psychological and family perspective—for adopting a
child.”113
The applicant complained that his application had been implicitly
rejected on the basis of his sexual orientation alone and that this
violated his right to non-discrimination under Article 14 in
conjunction with his right to private and prospective family life under
Article 8.114 The European Court noted, on the one hand, that Article
8 does not guarantee the right to adopt nor does it safeguard the mere
desire of founding a family; the right to family life presupposes an
existing family.115 However, the European Court found the issue to be
within the scope of Article 8 because French domestic law authorized
all single people to apply for adoption under prior authorization.116
There was a difference in treatment based on the applicant’s sexual
orientation, which was the decisive factor in the rejection of his
application.117 The legitimate aim pursued again lay in the protection
of the health and rights of the children involved in the subsequent
adoption.118 Moreover, the European Court found that the contracting
parties have a wide margin of appreciation on this topic because no
European consensus on social issues concerning adoption by single
110. Fretté v. France, App. No. 36515/97, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (2002), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60168.
111. Id. ¶ 9.
112. Id.
113. Id. ¶ 16.
114. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28.
115. Id. ¶ 32.
116. Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
117. Id.
118. Id. ¶ 38.
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gay people exists, and thus national authorities have a better grip of
the needs of its society.119 Based on this argument, the Court found
that France had stayed within this margin by limiting the right to
adoption in the interests of the child because scientific research was
divided on the consequences of adoption by homosexual persons—
either single or a couple—and there were more adoptive parents than
children in need of adoption.120
b. E.B. v. France121
This case deals with a similar situation: the applicant was a lesbian
woman, living with her partner, applying to the Jura Social Services
Department for authorization to adopt a child.122 Her authorization was
refused for the lack of a paternal role model and because the role of
her partner in the adoption remained unclear.123 The Nancy
Administrative Court of Appeal (“Nancy Court”) held that the
applicant, due to her lifestyle, could not provide the necessary
safeguards for adopting a child based on the reasons given by the Jura
Social Services Department.124 On appeal from this judgment, the
Conseil D’Etat agreed with the Nancy Court and held that the reasons
given were satisfactory to reject the application; even though the
Nancy Court’s reference to her lifestyle referred to her sexual
orientation, this was one of the factors that had to be taken into account
when deciding on her application.125
Before the European Court, the applicant complained that her right
to private life under Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 was
violated because of discrimination on the basis of her sexual
orientation.126 The European Court first found that the complaint fell
within the scope of Article 8.127 The European Court then referred to
119. Id. ¶ 41.
120. Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
121. E.B. v. France, App. No. 43546/02, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (2008), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-84571.
122. Id. ¶ 9.
123. Id. ¶ 17.
124. Id. ¶ 24 (highlighting the applicant’s lifestyle and the lack of a paternal role
model, among other reasons).
125. Id. ¶ 25.
126. Id. ¶ 32.
127. Id. ¶ 49 (explaining that Article 8 governs because the French legislation
permits all single persons to apply for authorization to adopt).

2014] THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE FREE FROM DISCRIMINATION

963

the Fretté case and found that the cases differed on certain points. In
this case, the domestic courts had not explicitly referred to the
applicant’s sexual orientation; rather, they considered her qualities as
an adoptive mother and her living situation.128 The European Court
then discussed the two reasons given by the domestic court for the
rejection. The European Court agreed that, in principle, the absence of
a paternal role model was a legitimate issue to consider; however,
since the issue concerned the adoption by a single person, this
consideration may nullify the right to adopt by single persons and, in
this case, might have led to arbitrary refusal on the basis of sexual
orientation.129
The European Court also concluded that the involvement of her
partner in the adoption was a legitimate point to consider for, if an
applicant has already set up a home with someone, that person’s
attitude and role in the household affects the child to be adopted.
Therefore, this reason could not be regarded as discriminatory on the
basis of sexual orientation and only dealt with investigation upon the
de facto situation in the household.130
However, these two main grounds are interrelated and need to be
taken together. Even though the domestic courts ascertained that the
refusal was not based on the applicant’s sexual orientation, the
European Court found that this was nonetheless the decisive ground
for the decision in an implicit manner. The European Court therefore
found a difference in treatment that in cases of sexual orientation can
only be justified by particularly convincing and weighty reasons. 131
Because the French law offers the possibility for single persons to
adopt a child, this possibility is also open for homosexuals and so the
government could not rely on the reasons it put forward. Further, the
domestic law did not mention the necessity of a role model of the other
sex, which would not be dependent on the sexual orientation of the
adoptive single parent.132 The European Court ultimately found that
the rejection breached Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8. 133
In Fretté, the European Court found no violation of Article 8’s right
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. ¶ 71.
Id. ¶ 73.
Id. ¶¶ 76–78.
Id. ¶ 91.
Id. ¶¶ 94–95.
Id. ¶ 98.
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to family or private life because France stayed within the margin of
appreciation accorded to states given the lack of a European majority
on the adoption by single gay people. Because scientific research was
not clear on the effects of this parental situation on children, it was up
to the state parties to identify the needs in their own society. It is
noteworthy that in E.B. the European Court did not mention the
European consensus and concluded that France violated the right to
private life by rejecting the application to adopt by a lesbian woman
because France did not have convincing and weighty reasons for the
differential treatment. Can we then presume that European consensus
exists on this point now?
c. Gas and Dubois v. France134
This case concerns adoption but within the sphere of a de facto
family life situation. The applicants, Gas and Dubois, were a lesbian
couple who had lived together since 1989.135 On September 21, 2000,
Dubois gave birth to a daughter, A, conceived by means of medicallyassisted procreation with an anonymous donor.136 The couple entered
into a registered partnership on April 15, 2002.137 In 2006 Gas applied
to adopt the child of her partner to which Dubois had consented. This
adoption was rejected because it ran counter to the best interests of the
child and the partner’s intentions. The application was not denied
because the pair was not deemed fit to raise the child but because of
legal implications—namely, the biological mother would lose her
parental rights over A.138
Before the European Court, the couple complained that their
different treatment on the basis of their sexual orientation violated
Article 14 in connection with the right to private and family life
protected by Article 8.139 In its admissibility decision of August 31,
2010, the European Court found that the fact that A was wished for by
both partners, that she was raised by both, and that both partners were
jointly and actively involved in her upbringing, made the relationship
134. Gas and Dubois v. France, App. No. 25951/07, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (2012),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109572.
135. Id. ¶ 9.
136. Id.
137. Id. ¶ 10
138. Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
139. Id. ¶ 34.
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between the applicants amount to family life within Article 8.140
Therefore, the complaint fell within the scope of a Convention right
and the claim under Article 14 could be examined. This case was the
first time the European Court recognized that the relationship between
same-sex partners and a child constituted family life under the
ECHR.141
In the decision on the merits, the European Court contrasted the case
with E.B. v. France.142 Under this case, the applicants could not share
parental responsibility over the child of one of the partners because an
exception only existed for married couples.143 The national courts
argued that this meant that the biological mother would lose her
parental rights over her daughter once Gas adopted her and this was
not in the best interest of the child.144 The applicants argued that this
was discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation because
they were treated differently from heterosexual couples, either married
or not.145
With regards to married couples, the European Court referred to
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria and recalled that the ECHR does not oblige
state parties to open access to the institute of marriage to same-sex
couples.146 Once a state decides to legally recognize same-sex couples
in any form, it has a certain margin of appreciation with regards to this
status.147 According to the European Court, a married couple adopting
the spouse’s child cannot be compared to that of an unmarried samesex couple wanting to do the same because of the social, personal, and
legal
consequences
that
come
with
marriage.148
Regarding unmarried heterosexual couples in registered
140. Gas and Dubois v. France, Admissibility Decision, App. No. 25951/07, Eur.
Comm’n H.R. 12 (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-103948.
141. Paul Johnson, Adoption, Homosexuality and the European Court on Human
Rights: Gas and Dubois v. France, 75 MOD. L. REV. 1136, 1139 (2012).
142. Gas and Dubois, App. No. 25951/07, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 61 (noting that
in E.B., the French law allowed single persons to adopt a child and the French
government did not offer sufficiently weighty or convincing reasons other than the
applicant’s personal situation to deny her application for adoption).
143. Id. ¶ 62.
144. Id.
145. Id. ¶ 64.
146. Id. ¶ 66.
147. Id.
148. Id. ¶ 68.
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partnerships, the European Court held that these were comparable but
did not find a violation because these couples were similarly unable to
adopt the child of their partner.149 It did not matter that heterosexual
couples can circumvent this obstacle by marrying because the ECHR
does not guarantee a right to marry for same-sex couples.150
It is noteworthy that, on the one hand, the European Court
recognized that the applicants and their daughter constituted a family,
while on the other hand the applicants’ situation did not equate the
family situation of a married heterosexual person wanting to adopt his
or her spouse’s child. At the same time, the claimants’ situation was
deemed comparable to that of a heterosexual couple in a registered
partnership, but the situations still differed in that heterosexual couples
can circumvent the domestic law on adoption by marrying, an option
that is not available to same-sex couples. Are these situations indeed
comparable?
Even though the domestic court proceedings discussed the best
interests of the child, the European Court did not assess this question.
According to the concurring opinion of Judge Costa, such an
investigation would require the European Court to act as a “fourth
instance,” leaving states a margin of appreciation in organizing the
institution of family, marriage, and relationships between adults and
children to better uphold the right under the ECHR.151 In Judge Viller’s
dissenting opinion, he disagreed and made clear that, in his view,
shared parenting is in the best interest of the child and that there could
be no legal justification for depriving a child of the full legal protection
of joint parenting on the basis of his parents’ sexual orientation.152
Here also lies a difference with the E.B. v. France decision, in which
the ECtHR scrutinized the way that the domestic courts came to
conclude what would be in the best interest of the child.
It is also significant that the European Court again referred to a
(non-existing) European consensus on the issue of same-sex adoption,
which it did not mention in E.B. v. France and where it found that a
single homosexual should be able to adopt a child in the same way as
149. Id. ¶ 69.
150. Id. ¶¶ 70–71 (referring to the findings in Schalk and Kopf in which the
European Court determined that neither Article 12 nor Article 14 in conjunction with
Article 8 obligates state parties to grant same-sex couples access to marriage).
151. Johnson, supra note 141, at 1143.
152. Id. at 1144–45.
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a single heterosexual—free from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.153 This is noteworthy for in cases such as Gas and Dubois,
where family life between the child and the adoptive parent already de
facto existed before adoption even took place, adoption would merely
mean a legal recognition of a factual situation of a family unit.
Whereas in Fretté and E.B., the adoptive parent was unfamiliar with
the child to be adopted and the situation seems more precarious. The
decision on adoption in cases placing a child in a new environment is
more radical than allowing the child to remain with the partner of one
of his parents in an already de facto family life. In the latter case, it
would be easier for European consensus to exist.
Johnson claims that the Gas and Dubois decision shows that the
European Court takes a “heteronormative” approach to marriage. 154
This judgment seems to protect the traditional sense of a family: even
though it views the relationship between the claimants and the
daughter as constituting family life, whether to legally recognize such
relationships is left to the states. In that sense this decision is similar
to that of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria; a family life de facto exists but
it is up to the states in their margin of appreciation to decide if and
how to legally recognize such relationships.
d. X. and Others v. Austria155
The most recent case before the European Court dealing with sexual
orientation discrimination within the sphere of family life, X. and
others v. Austria, concerns the application of a lesbian couple and the
biological son of one of them, born in 1995, all of whom had been
living together as a de facto family since the boy was around five years
old.156 On February 17, 2005, the first applicant concluded an
agreement with the second applicant, the son, to adopt him and create
a legal bond between them without severing the relationship between
him and the third applicant, his biological mother.157 However, aware
that Article 182(2) of the Austrian Civil Code excluded this
possibility, they asked the Austrian Constitutional Court to declare this
153. See id. at 1137 n.3.
154. Id. at 1146.
155. X. v. Austria, App. No. 19010/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-116735.
156. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
157. Id. ¶ 11.
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law unconstitutional for discriminating against them on the basis of
their sexual orientation.158 The Constitutional Court declined to do so
and stated that it was up to the relevant district court to determine the
legality of the adoption agreement under Article 182(2).159
In the subsequent procedure, the applicants explained that they
intended “to obtain legal recognition of their de facto family” with the
adoption agreement and that the first applicant would, in that sense,
substitute for the biological father.160 The domestic courts, including
the Supreme Court, held that the Austrian Civil Code did not provide
for such a form of adoption and that the adoption by the first applicant
would sever the bond between the child and his biological mother, not
that between the child and his biological father.161 The domestic courts
also stated that the protection of the traditional family falls within the
margin of appreciation accorded to state parties by the ECHR and that
the Austrian Civil Code stays within that margin by ensuring that a
child has a different-sex couple as parents due to the biological need
for contact with both a female and male parent while growing up.162
These facts are similar to those in Gas and Dubois, but the
applicants rushed to distinguish their case by claiming a violation of
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 on the basis that they were
“automatically excluded from any chance of adoption” on account of
their sexual orientation since Austrian Civil Law only allowed for
second-parent adoption for married and unmarried different-sex
couples.163
The European Court first confirmed that the applicants indeed
formed a de facto family and their complaint therefore fell within the
“family life” sphere defined by Article 8(2).164 The Court then outlined
three possible situations with respect to adoption by homosexual
people: i) an individual may apply for adoption by himself (individual
adoption); ii) a “partner in a same-sex couple may wish to adopt the
other partner’s child” so that both partners gain legally recognized
parental status (second-parent adoption); and iii) “a same-sex couple
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶¶ 58, 63–66.
Id. ¶¶ 95–97.
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may wish to adopt a child jointly” (joint adoption).165
As in Gas and Dubois, the European Court held that the applicants’
situation was not comparable to that of a married different-sex
couple.166 The Court then concluded that the applicant’s situation was
comparable to that of an unmarried different-sex couple agreeing to
second-parent adoption, which the applicants and the government
argued.167 Examining the Austrian Civil Code, the European Court
found that while it looked neutral, Article 182(2) made second-parent
adoption in a same-sex relationship legally impossible because
adoptive parents replace the same-sex biological parent, but the
biological ties in different-sex adoptions are not severed.168 This
differential treatment was also recognized by the domestic courts,
which held that the desired effect of the adoption agreement was in
principle impossible to attain and on that basis did not thoroughly
examine the circumstances of the case.169 The European Court
therefore found a differential treatment, which concerned all members
of the de facto family based on the sexual orientation of the same-sex
parents.170
The legitimate aims sought by this differential treatment consisted
of protection of the traditional family and the best interest of the child
involved.171 Citing its judgment in Karner, the European Court
referred to the concept of the ECHR as a living instrument which
forces the state parties to account for social changes and changing
perceptions with regards to social, civil status and relationships,
including freedom in one’s private and family life.172 According to the
European Court, the Austrian government did not bring forth any
evidence on the capabilities of same-sex couples to foresee a child’s
needs and conceded that same-sex couples might indeed be just as

165. Id. ¶ 100.
166. Id. ¶¶ 105–09 (reiterating its argument that the ECHR does not obligate state
parties to open access to marriage and concluding that the applicants’ situation was
not akin to that of a married couple seeking second-parent adoption).
167. Id. ¶¶ 111–12.
168. Id. ¶ 114.
169. Id. ¶ 123.
170. Id. ¶ 130.
171. See id. ¶ 137 (stating that one of the legitimate aims sought by the Austrian
legislature was to ensure that children had a relationship with both a male and female
parent-figure as they were growing up).
172. Id. ¶ 139.
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suitable adoptive parents as different-sex couples.173 Nevertheless, the
Austrian government wished to avoid a situation where a child had
two mothers or two fathers for legal purposes.174 Ultimately, the
European Court considered this legislation inconsistent with its
purported aim; under Austrian law, a child may be adopted through
individual adoption by a homosexual living with a registered partner
who approves of this adoption.175 Therefore, the Austrian Civil Code
makes it possible for a child to grow up with two equal sex parents,
though it does not offer legal recognition of this family life. 176 This is
peculiar, as noted above, and now recognized by the European Court,
because individual and joint adoption are more radical in that these
forms of adoption create a legal bond between a child and his or her
parent(s) whereas before there was not even a de facto family life.177
As to the margin of appreciation, which state parties have under
Article 8 on issues of adoption, the European Court argued that this
margin is narrow when it concerns discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.178 The European Court limited itself to examining
those state parties allowing second-parent adoption by unmarried
couples; this confined the Court to ten member states of which six
have opened this possibility for both different- as well as same-sex
couples, while four have taken the same approach as Austria.179 Given
the small number of examples, the European Court decided that no
conclusion could be drawn on the existence of a European consensus
on second-parent adoption.180 The Court’s analysis of the 2008
European Convention on the Adoption of Children—which has a low
number of ratifications except for Austria—drew a similar
conclusion.181 The European Court at the same time explained that its
Article 7(2) extends the possibility to adopt to “different-sex couples
and same-sex couples who are living together in a stable relationship,”

173. Id. ¶ 142.
174. Id.
175. See id. ¶ 40 (stating that if one party of a registered partnership wants to
adopt a child under Article 181, section 1, sub-paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, his
partner must consent).
176. Id. ¶ 144.
177. Id. ¶ 146.
178. Id. ¶ 148.
179. Id. ¶ 149.
180. Id.
181. Id. ¶ 150.
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which indicates that state parties are not free to treat different- and
same-sex couples in a stable relationship differently.182
In conclusion, the European Court found that excluding unmarried,
same-sex couples from second-parent adoption while allowing
unmarried different-sex couples to adopt was not necessary or
proportionate to the aim of protecting the traditional family or the best
interest of the child.183 The distinction therefore constitutes
discrimination in the sense that the applicants’ adoption agreement
were not examined in a meaningful way following the best interest of
the child involved, “given that it was in any case legally
impossible.”184 This constituted a violation of Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 8.185
The dissenting opinion, rather than answering the same narrow
question as the majority, examined the substantive issue of whether
the applicants should have been granted the second-parent adoption
under these circumstances.186 For example, the best interests of the
child, a factor disregarded by the majority, did not indicate that
adoption was necessary because the child involved could count on his
relationships with his biological mother and father,187 the latter of
which could not be severed lightly.188
The dissent showed that there is no European consensus on the
subject of second-parent adoption by unmarried same-sex couples.189
While the majority opinion only used a small control group of ten state
parties, the majority of state parties to the ECHR do not allow for
second-parent adoption by unmarried couples, either hetero- or
homosexual.190
182. Id.
183. Id. ¶ 146.
184. Id. ¶ 152.
185. Id. ¶ 153.
186. Id. ¶¶ 7–11 (Casadevall, J., Ziemele, J., Kovler, J., Jočienė, J., Šikuta, J., de
Gaetano, J., and Sicilianos, J., dissenting in part); Stijn Smet, X. and Others v.
Austria (Part II): A Narrow Ruling on a Narrow Issue, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS
BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013), available at http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/03/06/xand-others-v-austria-part-ii-a-narrow-ruling-on-a-narrow-issue/.
187. X., App. No. 19010/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 8 (dissenting opinion).
188. See id. (asserting that in the case at hand the child has always had a family).
189. See Smet, supra note 186 (demonstrating that no European consensus exists
on the issue as six out of ten Council of Europe member states have opted for one
approach while four have opted for an opposite approach).
190. X., App. No. 19010/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 14–15 (dissenting opinion).
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Despite this lack of consensus, the majority decision, in the opinion
of the dissenting judges, imposed a social change upon state parties
which has not yet naturally evolved and seems to take the “living
instrument” doctrine to a new level.191
The question is therefore what the Grand Chamber’s majority
decision requires of the Austrian government. The judgment stresses
on numerous occasions that “the Court is not called upon to rule on
the issue of second-parent adoption by same-sex couples as such, let
alone on the question of adoption by same-sex couples in general” and
that the judgment focuses on the question whether the applicants were
discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation because
of the impossibility to have their adoption agreement recognized.192
Thus, for the individual case at hand, a meaningful re-examination by
the domestic courts of the adoption agreement seems necessary in
order to examine the best interest of the child. However, such a reexamination of the case seems futile where Article 182(2) of the
Austrian Civil Code has not been modified to comply with this
decision. Therefore, the Grand Chamber’s decision in X. and others v.
Austria implies that once a state party opens up second-parent
adoption for unmarried different-sex couples, it should also do so for
same-sex couples. Does the Grand Chamber’s judgment take the
living instrument doctrine to a new level pushing for a social change
that has not yet evolved across the Council of Europe region?
Both Gas and Dubois and X. and others v. Austria concern a lesbian
couple in which one of the partners wished to adopt the other partner’s
child; both attempts were deemed impossible under the states’ laws
given the same legal implication—namely that the adoptive mother
would not replace the biological father but the mother. In the first case,
the domestic courts submitted that such an adoption would, for this
reason, not be in the best interest of the child, while the Austrian
domestic courts in the latter case did not reach that level of
examination, but instead at first glance pronounced the adoption
legally impossible.193 The European Court itself, in both cases, did not
examine the best interest for that would imply, as concurring Judge
191. See id. ¶ 23 (dissenting opinion).
192. Id. ¶¶ 134, 149.
193. Id. ¶ 13; Gas and Dubois v. France, App. No. 25951/07, Eur. Comm’n H.R.
¶ 62 (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-109572.
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Costa in Gas and Dubois stated that the European Court should be a
court of “fourth instance.”194 This is echoed in how, in X. and Others
v. Austria, the European Court emphasized that it was not called upon
to examine the possibility of second-parent adoption in general.195
In both cases, the European Court further recognized that the
lesbian couples along with their respective children formed a de facto
family unit which is protected by the right to family life under Article
8. In Gas and Dubois, the European Court left it up to the state parties
if and how to legally recognize such a family within their margin of
appreciation and held that the applicants were not in a situation
comparable to that of a married heterosexual couple.196 Given that,
under French law in force at that time, second-parent adoption was
only open for married couples, the applicants had not been
discriminated against when compared to unmarried heterosexual
couples.197 The principal difference between the cases therefore lies in
the fact that under the Austrian Civil Code, second-parent adoption
was available to unmarried heterosexual couples, but not to unmarried
same-sex couples. With the judgment in X. and Others v. Austria, the
European Court made clear that once the institution of second-parent
adoption is opened for unmarried couples, it should be so for differentsex as well as same-sex couples.198 Not only can same-sex couples and
their children form a de facto family, the possibility of second-parent
adoption should be open and legally recognize such a family when this
possibility exists for unmarried heterosexual couples.

IV. THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE FREE FROM
DISCRIMINATION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION:
ACTHR
The Organization of American States (“OAS”),199 established under
194. Gas and Dubois, App. No. 25951/07, Eur. Comm’n H.R. at 22 (Costa, J.,
concurring).
195. X., App. No. 19010/07, Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 134.
196. Id. ¶¶ 58–60.
197. Id. ¶¶ 68–69.
198. See X., App. No. 19010/07, Eur. Ct. H.R ¶¶ 135–36 (noting that once a State
has voluntarily decided to permit adoption by a single homosexual it then has an
obligation under Article 14 to ensure that this right is not accorded in a
discriminatory manner).
199. See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 199
U.N.T.S. 3, Protocol of Amend. Feb. 23, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847
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the OAS Charter of the Organization of American States in 1948, is
an organization comparable to the Council of Europe and promotes
and
protects
human
rights
in
the
Americas. 200
The Inter-American human rights system distinguishes itself from
other regional human right protection schemes because it consists of
two different instruments.201 On the one side, its Charter system is
based on the OAS Charter and the American Declaration on the Rights
of Duties of Man; on the other side, the ACHR offers human rights
protection in those OAS Members States which are party to it.202 The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Inter-American
Commission”) is a central organ in both systems and receives
communications from individuals claiming violation of either the
Declaration or the ACHR.203 Also, under Article 45(1) of the ACHR,
state parties can accept the competence of the Commission to receive
and
examine
inter-state
complaints.204
The Inter-American Court was established as a judicial organ under
the ACHR and as such only has jurisdiction over inter-state and
individual complaints against state parties to the Convention that have
explicitly accepted this jurisdiction by a declaration.205 Further, it has
the competency to give advisory opinions to state parties requesting
an interpretation of the Convention or other human right instruments
in the Americas or on the compatibility of its national legislation with
such instruments.206 Certain organs of the OAS are in the position to
ask the court for the same advisory opinions on the interpretation of
the
Convention
and
other
regional
instruments.207
For a case to come before the Inter-American Court, a certain
[hereinafter
OAS
Charter];
Member
States,
ORG.
AM.
STS.,
http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2014)
(providing a list of all OAS member States).
200. JAVAID REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 271 (2d ed. 2010).
201. Id. at 272.
202. Id.
203. See ACHR, supra note 32, arts. 33(a), 44; OAS Charter, supra note 199, art.
106.
204. ACHR, supra note 32, art. 45(1).
205. See id. art. 62 (specifying that such a declaration can be made in general
(paragraph 1) or for a specific period of time or for specific case(s) (paragraph 2));
Jo Pasqualucci, The Americas, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 433, 442
(Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2010).
206. ACHR, supra note 32, art. 64.
207. Id. art. 64(1).

2014] THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE FREE FROM DISCRIMINATION

975

procedure needs to be followed.208 According to Article 48(1), the
Inter-American Commission examines a complaint, decides on its
admissibility, and tries to work toward a friendly settlement between
the parties.209 If a friendly settlement is not reached, the InterAmerican Commission draws up a report to send to the relevant state
party, making proposals and recommendations as it sees fit.210
Following this report, both the Inter-American Commission and the
state party concerned can refer the case to the Inter-American Court
within a term of three months.211 The individual applicant does not
have standing to bring a case before the Court; but once the case has
been submitted, the individual is no longer represented by the InterAmerican Commission and represents himself.212
This article is limited to the Inter-American Court for it has recently
pronounced itself on the right to family life in custody decisions where
one of the parents is discriminated on the basis of his sexual
orientation in the ground-breaking case Atala Riffo y Niñas v. Chile.213
Once the issues are before the Court, how does the Inter-American
Court deal with the right to family life as described in Articles 11 and
17 of the ACHR in connection to the prohibition of discrimination in
Article 1(1)? Which social entities constitute a family under the InterAmerican human rights system, deserving of protection? And how has
the Inter-American Court ruled on cases of discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation in connection to family life, particularly in
custody cases?

A. DEFINITION OF FAMILY IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
Neither the Inter-American Commission nor the Inter-American
Court have said much about the scope of the term family in the context
of same-sex relationships under Article 11.214 Article VI of the
208. Id. art. 61(2).
209. Id. art. 48(1).
210. Id. art. 50.
211. Id. art. 51(1).
212. Id. art. 61.
213. Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 27, 2012).
214. See Loveday Hodson, Family Values: The Recognition of Same-Sex
Relationships in International Law, 22 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 33, 43–44 (2004)
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American Declaration215 establishes that “[e]very person has the right
to establish a family . . . and to receive protection” and Article 15 of
the San Salvador Protocol uses similar wording.216 Davidson submits
that this language seems broader than that of Article 17 of the
ACHR217 and that it possibly suggests that single parent and same-sex
parent families are protected under family life.218 Nevertheless, the
traditional concept of family seems supported in this regional human
rights system as well.219
It is telling that the Inter-American Commission in Marta Lucía
Álvarez Giraldo v. Colombia220 found the application admissible on
the grounds of a possible violation of the right to private life under
Article 11(2) of the ACHR.221 The case concerned a lesbian prisoner
who was not allowed to have intimate visits with her partner; such
visits would have been possible if she were heterosexual.222 Rather
than interpret this issue as a violation of the right to family life, the
Inter-American Commission chose to frame the issue within private
life, as seen in the earlier cases before the European Court.223
However, with the recent judgment of the Inter-American Court in
the case of Atala Riffo y Niñas v. Chile,224 the case law has evolved. It

(explaining that the two treaty-monitoring bodies have been preoccupied with
extreme rights’ violations, like disappearances).
215. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 6, adopted May
2, 1948, by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota,
Columbia, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 17, OEA/ser. L./V/II.7I doc. 6 rev I (1987).
216. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 15, 1988 O.A.S.T.S. No. 69
(1988), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, art. 10(1), at 67 (1992).
217. Scott Davidson, Civil and Political Rights Protections, in THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 271, 273 (D. Harris & S. Livingstone eds.,
1998).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Giraldo v. Colombia, Case 11.656, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report No.
71/99 (1999), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/admissible/
colombia11656.htm#_ftn1.
221. Id. ¶¶ 21–23.
222. Id. ¶¶ 6–8.
223. Hodson, supra note 214, at 44.
224. Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 27, 2012).
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was the first case under the ACHR in which the Inter-American Court
found discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation prohibited by
the ACHR.225 Furthermore, the Inter-American Court criticized Chile
for its narrow, stereotyped interpretation of the concept of family
under the ACHR.226

B. INTER-AMERICAN CASE LAW: ATALA RIFFO Y NIÑAS V. CHILE
1. Facts of the Case
The facts of the case are parallel to those in Salgueiro da Silva
Mouta v. Portugal,227 as discussed under the ECHR system.
Ms. Karen Atala Riffo married Ricardo Jaime Lópes Allendes in
1993 and together they had three daughters, M., V., and R., born in
1994, 1998, and 1999, respectively.228 In March 2002, they separated
and ended their marriage but they mutually agreed that Atala would
maintain the care and custody of the children.229 In November 2002,
Ms. Emma de Ramón, Ms. Atala’s new partner, moved into her house
to live with the three daughters and Atala’s son from a former
marriage.230
The father of the daughters thereupon filed a custody suit with the
Juvenile Court of Villarica.231 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Chile
granted the father permanent custody.232 The Supreme Court based its
decision on the best interests of the children and concluded that, Atala
could not retain custody because she had put her own interests over
those of her children by choosing to live with her lesbian partner.233
These living arrangements would potentially confuse the daughters
225. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHILE: GAY RIGHTS RULING A LEAP FORWARD
(2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/23/chile-gay-rights-rulingleap-forward.
226. Atala Riffo, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
239, ¶ 145.
227. Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, Eur. Comm’n
H.R. (1999), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?
i=001-58404.
228. Atala Riffo, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
239, ¶ 30.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. ¶ 31.
232. Id. ¶ 54.
233. Id. ¶¶ 55–56.
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since a male father was absent from the home and replaced by another
female.234 Further, their development would be at risk because their
vulnerable position would open them up to discrimination and
ostracism.235 It was therefore preferable that the children grew up
“within the bosom of a family that is structured normally and
appreciated in the social environment, according to the proper
traditional model.”236
2. Violation of Articles 1(1) and 24 of the ACHR: Discrimination on
the Basis of Sexual Orientation
2.1 Inclusion of Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation
Under the ACHR
After setting out the facts of the case, the Inter-American Court first
assessed the complaint of violations of Articles 1(1) and 24 of ACHR.
The Inter-American Court explained that it interprets the ACHR as
a living instrument, paying attention to “evolving times and current
living conditions.”237 When interpreting “any other social condition”
as written in Article 1(1), it must follow the most favorable
interpretation to the protection of the rights under the ACHR.238
Moreover, the list of prohibited distinctions in Article 1(1) is
illustrative and the words “another social condition” allow for more
criteria under the most favorable protection principle.239 The InterAmerican Court listed European and universal case law in which
treaty bodies have included sexual orientation as a basis upon which
no discrimination is allowed.240
The Inter-American Court then concluded that, under the ACHR,
discrimination for reasons of sexual orientation is prohibited and state
parties may not restrict or diminish the enjoyment of the rights therein
on the basis of a person’s sexual orientation.241 The fact that in some
234. See id. ¶ 56 (asserting that testimony from those close to the children stated
that the children had adopted games and attitudes reflecting confusion about the
sexuality of their mother).
235. Id. ¶¶ 54–57.
236. Id. ¶ 57.
237. Id. ¶ 83.
238. Id. ¶ 84.
239. Id. ¶ 85.
240. Id. ¶¶ 87–90.
241. Id. ¶ 91.
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countries no consensus appears to exist with regards to the full respect
for the rights of sexual minorities cannot mean that discrimination for
reasons of sexual orientation is allowed, nor can the fact that
discrimination on sexual orientation is viewed as a controversial
issue.242
In that sense, the Inter-American Court appears to take a different
approach than the European Court which seems to account for the
gradual recognition of the rights under the ECHR free from
discrimination on sexual orientation on European consensus. In Fretté,
for example, a European consensus did not yet exist on the issue of
single parent adoption by homosexuals, so the recognition of the rights
of sexual minorities fell within the margin of appreciation of the state
parties.243 The same can be said for its judgment in Gas and Dubois
where again the European Court referred to European consensus and
the margin of appreciation.244 The European Court seemed to take the
same approach again in X. and others v. Austria where it explained
away the lack of European consensus as inconclusive and therefore
accepted only a narrow margin of appreciation.245 The Inter-American
Court, conversely, does not pay heed to how acceptance of gay rights
is not a fact throughout the region of the Americas.246
a. Difference in Treatment Based on Sexual Orientation and Its
Justification
The Inter-American Court first examined whether Atala suffered
from treatment differing from that of her former husband.247 It cited
E.B. v. France, explaining that it is not necessary for a decision to be
based solely and fundamentally on the person’s sexual orientation to
242. Id. ¶¶ 91–92.
243. See Fretté v. France, App. No. 36515/97, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 36 (2002),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60168
(recognizing the “total” lack of consensus regarding single-parent homosexual
adoption among European Union States).
244. Gas and Dubois v. France, App. No. 25951/07, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶¶ 59–
60 (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?
i=001-109572.
245. X., App. No. 19010/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 148.
246. See Atala Riffo, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 239, ¶ 93 (deciding, after evaluating European case law and the lack of a
European consensus, that “a right granted to all persons cannot be denied or
restricted under any circumstances based on their sexual orientation”).
247. Id. ¶ 95.
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amount to a difference in treatment; it is sufficient that this
circumstance is taken into account.248
The Inter-American Court then looked into whether Atala was
treated differently from her ex-husband during the custody
proceedings and found that the fact that these proceedings were
instigated by a complaint of her abilities to take care of the children
on the basis of her sexual orientation, her sexual orientation was a
central discussion in the judgment.249 The Supreme Court’s reasoning
for the decision, as set out earlier, reflects this: the living arrangements
would damage the development of the girls because of possible
discrimination for their mother’s sexuality and would cause confusion
with regards to sexual roles; further, by expressing her sexuality, Atala
had chosen her own interests over that of her children.250 The sexual
orientation of the applicant therefore played a significant role in the
custody proceedings, while the same could not be said for the sexuality
of her former husband.251
As to the provisional custody ruling, the Juvenile Court argued that
Atala chose her own interests over that of her daughters and that, in a
heterosexual and traditional society, the children were better suited to
grow up with the father.252 Therefore, it also based its arguments on
the parties’ sexual orientation.
The next question that the Inter-American Court answered was
whether this differential treatment served a legitimate purpose. This
question was answered easily: the difference in treatment amounted to
the protection of the best interest of the children involved.253
The Inter-American Court, contrary to the European Court in Gas
and Dubois v. France, then scrutinized the domestic court’s approach
in assessing the best interest of the children involved. The InterAmerican Court held that the best interest of the children requires
assessing the specific parental behaviors and their impact upon the
children, as well as the proven and real risks of damage to the

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. ¶ 94 n.115.
Id. ¶ 96.
Id. ¶ 97.
Id.
Id. ¶ 98.
Id. ¶¶ 99, 114.
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children’s wellbeing.254 Mere speculations, fears, prejudices, and
stereotypes are not sufficient to infringe on the mother’s right to be
free of discrimination.255
Even though the Inter-American Court here did not explicitly
mention these terms, as did the European Court, it examined whether
the differential treatment was proportional to the aim of protecting the
best interest of the child.256 Were the children’s interests actually
served by the difference in treatment in this particular case?
With regard to the argument of the fear of social discrimination of
the children, the Inter-American Court ruled that this argument did not
fulfil the purpose of protecting the children’s best interests.257 The
discrimination and ostracism of the daughters for the sexual
orientation of their mother, as described, was conditional and abstract;
the Inter-American Court saw it more as a possibility rather than a
reality based on facts that had already taken place.258 Even if
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is common in society,
a state cannot justify its own discriminatory treatment with such a
fact.259 States should fight such unequal treatment because of their
obligation under Article 2 of the ACHR to make its rights effective for
everyone and promote social progress.260
In principle, the best interest of the child is an important factor when
it might be affected by the rejection of society; however a potential
social stigma on the basis of the parent’s sexual orientation cannot be
considered a valid harm for the purposes of determining those best
interests. Such social discrimination cannot be legitimized by arguing
that it is in the child’s best interest for the state to discriminate on this
same basis.261
As to the confusion of sexual roles, the same reasoning held that the
state needs to prove that the decision is based on clear, specific, and

254. Id. ¶¶ 107–09.
255. Id. ¶ 109.
256. See id. ¶¶ 143–44 (citing cases from the European Court that assessed the
proportionality between the measure taken and the purpose sought).
257. Id. ¶ 122.
258. Id. ¶ 118.
259. Id. ¶ 119.
260. Id. ¶¶ 119–20.
261. Id. ¶ 121.
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real harm to the children’s development.262 The Inter-American Court
went on to mention scientific research that shows that living with
same-sex parents does not per se affect a child’s emotional and
psychological development and that, essentially, one’s sexual
orientation does not affect the ability to raise a child.263 The InterAmerican Court concludes that the Chilean Supreme Court merely
based its argument again on possibilities without providing evidence
that proved that the parents’ sexual orientation had a negative effect
on the children’s development and wellbeing.264 This differs from the
Fretté case where the European Court concluded that scientific
research differed on the consequences of adoption by homosexual
persons, and therefore it was up to state parties to decide on the
adequacy of adoption by homosexual persons.265
Discussing the alleged privilege of her own interests over those of
her children, the Court made clear that the right to be free from
discrimination on one’s sexual orientation also includes the expression
of sexual orientation.266 This freedom is linked to the right to selfdetermination and to make one’s own choices as to lifestyle; in that
sense, it is linked to the right to private life under Article 11 of the
ACHR. It was therefore not reasonable to expect Ms. Atala to put her
own life on hold to protect her children, as no evidence existed to
suggest that her lifestyle change would damage her children.267 To
require this of her would impose traditional family notions that the
mother needs to take care of the children without fulfilling her own
identity. The Inter-American Court therefore found that this argument
could not protect the best interest of the children involved.268
Lastly, the Inter-American Court delved deeper into the concept of
the normal and traditional family. It confirmed that the ACHR does
not define a limited concept of family nor does it restrict itself to
traditional families.269 Family encompasses not only marriage but also
262. Id. ¶ 127.
263. Id. ¶¶ 128–29.
264. Id. ¶ 130.
265. Fretté v. France, App. No. 36515/97, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶¶ 42–43 (2002),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60168.
266. Atala Riffo, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
239, ¶ 133.
267. Id. ¶ 139.
268. Id. ¶¶ 139–40.
269. Id. ¶ 142.
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de facto family ties.270 The Inter-American Court then concluded that
the Chilean Supreme Court used a limited and stereotyped concept of
family when it said that the children need to grow up in a normally
structured family within its social environment for which there is no
place under the convention.271
Taking all these arguments together, the Inter-American Court
found violations of Article 24 and Article 1(1) of the ACHR for
discriminatory treatment on the basis of sexual orientation that cannot
be justified on the grounds of the legitimate aim of protecting the
children.272
It is noteworthy that the Inter-American Court came to these
violations of Articles 1(1) and 24 even before it examined whether the
complaint fell within the scope of one of the provisions of the ACHR.
This is striking especially considering that Article 1(1) prohibits
discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms given by
the ACHR. Would it then not need to establish first if and which rights
are involved?
b. Violation of Article 11 (2) in Conjunction with Article 17: The
Right to Family Life
The Inter-American Court next considered whether the rights to
private life and family life under Articles 11 and 17 of the ACHR were
violated by the national court’s decision on custody.
First, the Inter-American Court discussed the scope of private life
under Article 11, which includes one’s sex life and the right to
establish and develop relationships with others.273 However, it is not
an absolute right and interference is allowed insofar as it is provided
for by law, pursues a legitimate aim, and is suitable, necessary, and
proportional to achieve that aim.274
Chile’s interference with Atala’s private life needed to fulfil these
requirements because it concerned her sexual orientation. The InterAmerican Court decided that Chile violated Article 11(2) in
270. See id. ¶¶ 143–44 (referring to Salguiero da Mouta Silva v. Portugal and
Karner v. Austria to illustrate that international case law is consistent on this point).
271. Id. ¶ 145.
272. Id. ¶ 146.
273. Id. ¶ 162.
274. Id. ¶ 164.
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conjunction with Article 1(1) since the interference with Atala’s
private life could not be justified as being in the best interest of the
children involved because the examination into her private life was
unsuitable and disproportionate.275 Upon its decision on permanent
custody, the Chilean Supreme Court should have restricted itself to
examining parental behavior without exposing and scrutinizing the
parties’ sexual orientation.276
Subsequently, the Inter-American Court linked the right to be free
from arbitrary interference in one’s family life protected by Article
11(2) to Article 17’s right to protection of the family and the right to
live in a family.277 The right protected under Article 11(2) is implicitly
part of the right under Article 17 to protection of the family.278 After
analyzing other treaty monitoring bodies, the Inter-American Court
concluded that there is not one single concept of family. 279 The InterAmerican Court then discussed the case law on the right to family life
under Article 8 of the European Court, which adopts a broad concept
of family that includes same-sex relationships.280 In the InterAmerican system, the right to family life is complementarily protected
by both Article 11(2) as well as Article 17.281
Applying these dual protections to the current case, the InterAmerican Court established that from November 2002 to May 2003
there was a close relationship between the daughters and Atala’s new
partner as in any normal family.282 It concluded that a new family unit
was formed between the girls, the son from a former marriage, the
mother, and her new partner, protected under Articles 11(2) and 17; it
existed without prejudice to the other family unit composed of the
daughters and their father.283 Therefore, the Inter-American Court
found violations of both Articles in conjunction with Article 1(1) of
the ACHR because the custody decisions of the Supreme Court and
the Juvenile Court were not in the best interest of the children and

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. ¶ 166.
Id. ¶¶ 165–67.
Id. ¶ 169.
Id. ¶¶ 169–70.
Id. ¶ 172.
Id. ¶¶ 172–74.
Id. ¶ 175.
Id. ¶ 176.
Id. ¶¶ 176–77.

2014] THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE FREE FROM DISCRIMINATION

985

separated the daughters from this new family environment.284
It is remarkable that compared to the ECtHR in Salguiero, the InterAmerican Court explicitly mentions that the new lesbian partner is part
of the family unit as protected by the relevant convention. While the
European Court in Salguiero focused on the relationship between the
daughter and her father as the family unit, it left open whether the same
family ties existed between the daughter and her father’s new life
partner.285 Conversely, the Inter-American Court in Atala Riffo left no
such doubt and held that de facto family ties can form themselves
between the children of one parent and his new same-sex partner; it
concludes that the new family as a unit requires protection.286 The
European Court, in the latter admissibility decision in Gas and Dubois
and its judgment in X. and others v. Austria, has recognized that the
situation of one same-sex partner, his biological child, and the other
partner constitutes a family as to be protected under the treaty.287

V. CONCLUSION
To what extent now have the regional human rights systems of
Europe and the Americas developed a right to family life, free from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?
The provisions on discrimination of the regional systems of human
rights in Europe and the Americas do not expressly contain sexual
orientation as a prohibited ground for differential treatment. The
wording of Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 1(1) of the ACHR
however, leave enough room for their supervising courts to extend the
scope of the right to be free from discrimination with the prohibited
ground of sexual orientation.

284. Id. ¶ 178.
285. Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, Eur. Comm’n
H.R. ¶ 14 (1999), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-58404.
286. See Atala Riffo, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 239, ¶ 142.
287. See X. v. Austria, App. No. 19010/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 95 (2013), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-116735 (recognizing
that the relationship of a cohabitating same-sex couple living in a stable de facto
relationship falls within the notion of “family life”); Gas and Dubois v. France, App.
No. 25951/07, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 37 (2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109572.
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Linking this prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation to the right to family life under the regional human rights
treaties, how have the regional human rights courts handled questions
of parenting by gay parents? Specifically, how do they see issues of
adoption and custody decisions in connection to discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation?
The European Court has recognized that the relationship between
same-sex partners constitutes family life in its Schalk and Kopf v.
Austria decision, even though the state parties have a margin of
appreciation regarding if and how they legally recognize such a
relationship. From the Salgueiro case we can conclude that the
European Court views the relationship between a biological parent in
a same-sex relationship and his child as to constitute family life,
though it did not clarify whether the newly created situation of a samesex couple living with one of the pair’s biological child constituted a
new family unit protected under the ECHR. In its admissibility
decision in Gas and Dubois analyzing adoption by the same-sex
partner of the biological child of the other partner, the European Court
decided that a de facto family existed between the same-sex couple
and the child. This was also the case in X. and others v. Austria where
the European Court further held that if this form of adoption is
available to unmarried heterosexual couples, then it should also be
open to unmarried homosexual partners as a form of obtaining legal
recognition of the de facto family.
The Inter-American Court in Atala also explicitly recognized that
situations of a same-sex couples living together with the biological
child(ren) of either of them creates a new family unit, but decided that
the family life continues to exist between the child and the other
biological parent. The concept of family under both systems then
reaches beyond the traditional family and adapts to social changes.
Both regional courts have therefore made clear that a difference in
treatment concerning issues of family life cannot serve a legitimate
aim or be proportionate one if it is based on sexual orientation in a
decisive manner.
Interestingly, both the European Court, in Fretté and E.B., and the
Inter-American Court, in Atala, scrutinized the domestic court cases
to determine what was in the best interests of the children. Yet, in the
Gas and Dubois case, the European Court ignored the issue of the best
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interests of the child, even though it was a big part of the domestic
proceedings. There, the European Court solely addressed whether the
situation was comparable to married or unmarried heterosexual
couples. Since neither was the case, there was no differential treatment
and no need to determine whether such treatment could be justified.
The same can be said for X. and others v. Austria, where the European
Court found unmarried same-sex and different-sex couples were
comparable, the latter of which was eligible for second-parent
adoption
while
the
former
was
not.
Finally, in Atala, the Inter-American Court found that the lack of
consensus within some countries on the full respect of rights for sexual
minorities was an invalid basis to restrict their human rights. This
seems to conflict with the European Court decisions in Gas and
Dubois and Fretté, where the European Court looked at the existence
of European consensus on the issue of gay parenting and found that,
because no such consensus existed, states have a margin of
appreciation in legally recognizing the de facto relationship between a
child and his same-sex parents. The reasoning of the European Court
in X. and others v. Austria seems closer to that of the Inter-American
Court since the European Court was inconclusive on whether
European consensus existed with respect to second-parent adoption by
unmarried couples, while, objectively, it could be stated no European
consensus, in fact exists. This conclusion would have allowed for a
wider margin of appreciation. Instead, a narrow margin of
appreciation was left to state parties in favor of the right to family life
of same-sex couples and their de facto families, irrespective of the
position of state parties to the Convention regarding these rights. Does
this mean that the European approach is moving away from favoring
the traditional family towards a more encompassing concept and
toward the Inter-American Court where the rights of sexual minorities
prevail?

